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LABOR LAw -Loss OF MAJORITY SUPPORT BY REPRESENTATIVE WITH
WHOM EMPLOYER HAS BEEN ORDERED To BARGAIN -The National Labor
Relations Board found that the employer (respondent) had been guilty of unfair
labor practices by interfering with the employees' right to unionize and by refusing to bargain collectively with the Pioneer Tobacco Workers' Local Industrial Union No. 55 when the latter had been designated as the bargaining
agent by a majority of the employees in an appropriate bargaining unit. During
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the proceedings before the board a motion for leave to intervene was filed by an
independent union claiming the support of a majority of the employees, but the
motion was denied by the board. The board ordered the employer to desist
from refusing to bargain collectively with Local 55 as the exclusive representative
of the employees.1 Upon a petition for enforcement, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit upheld the findings of the board but required the
board to conduct an election to determine whether Local 55 still had the support
of a majority of the employe·es.2 Held, on appeal to the Supreme Court, the
orders of the board should be enforced without the necessity of conducting an
election. National Labor Relations Board v. P. Lorillard Co., 314 U.S. 512,
62 S. Ct. 397 (1942).
The National Labor Relations Act 3 imposes the duty upon employers to
bargain collectively with their employees through the bargaining agent selected
by a majority of the employees in an appropriate bargaining unit. 4 When it
has been shown that the employer has refused so to bargain, the board normally
has ordered the employer to bargain collectively with the union shown to represent the employees at the time of the violation. 5 If, however, it is alleged that
during the interim between the failure to bargain collectively and the issuance
of the order by the board the bargaining agent has lost the support of a majority
of the employees, the question arises whether or not the employer should be
compelled to bargain with this agent notwithstanding the alleged lack of majority support. The board has taken the position that the employer must first
remedy the effect of the unfair labor practice by bargaining with the union
having the authority to represent the employees at the time of the commission of
the unlawful practice, and until the effect of the unfair labor practice has been
removed no representation proceedings 6 will be entertained. 7 It would seem
clear that in so far as the rights of the employer are concerned this position is
correct. It would be scarcely justifiable for the employer to refuse to bargain
collectively with a union having the support of a majority of the employees and
then, after board action has been taken, offei; the loss of a majority following by
this union as a defense, when, for all that appears, he should have been bargain16 N.L.R.B. 684 (1939).
117 F. (2d) 921 (1941).
3 49 Stat. L. 449 (1935), 29 U.S.C. (1940), § 151 at seq.
4 Id.,§ 8: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer •.• (5) To refuse to
bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees. • ." See Smith, "The
Evolution of the 'Duty to Bargain' Concept in American Law," 39 M1cH. L. REV.
1065 (1941).
5 In the Matter of Jeffery-De Witt Insulator Co., 1 N.L.R.B. 618 (1936).
6 Normally representatives for collective bargaining are selected after a petition has
· been filed by a union purporting to have the support of a majority of the employees of
an appropriate unit and asking for board certification under § 9 of the act, and the
_entire process is known as representation proceedings.
7 ln the Matter of Inland Steel Co., 9 N.L.R.B. 783 (1938). See RosENFARB,
NATIONAL LABOR. Poucy AND How IT WoRKS 586-587 (1940), and cases therein
cited. See N.L.R.B. v. Remington Rand, (C.C.A. 2d, 1938) 94 F. (2d) 862.
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ing with this union all along. 8 Nor would a company-dominated union be in a
position to offer the loss of majority support by the union having a majority at
the time of the commission of the unfair labor practice as a reason why the
employer should not be compelled to bargain with this latter union, since it does
not represent the uncoerced wishes of a majority of the workers. 9 In the principal case, the board refused to consider the claim for recognition of a union
_which purported to have obtained the support of a majority since the commission
of the unfair labor practice, even though there was no allegation that it was
employer dominated. The Supreme Court upheld the board action on the ground
that compelling the employer to bargain collectively with the union which was
the representative of the employees at the date of the commission of the unfair
labor practice was matter within the discretion of the board as a part of its duty
to remedy the effect of unfair labor practices.10 Thus the result reached is that
after the employer has refused to bargain collectively the employees who have
not necessarily been involved in the unfair labor practice have lost a right guaranteed to them under the National Labor Relations Act, i.e., the right to have a
majority select agents for collective bargaining,11 until such necessarily uncertain
time as the effect of the unfair labor practice has been removed. It would seem
that this goes beyond the scope of remedying the effect of the unfair labor practice.12 Perhaps the opinion of the Court should not be taken to go so far, and
all that is decided here is that the board should not be compelled as a matter of
procedure to hear the claims for recognition of the intervening union in the
proceedings concerning the unfair lab<?r practice. But the board did not deny
the petition on procedural grounds, nor has it indicated its willingness to hear
the claims immediately in a separate representation proceedings under section
9c.13
Charles J. O'Laughlin
8 N.L.R.B. v. Bradford Dyeing Assn., 310 U.S. 318, 60 S.Ct. 918 (1940);
Oughton v. N.L.R.B., (C.C.A. 3d, 1941) II8 F. (2d) 486, cert. den., (U.S. 1942)
62 S.Ct. 485. But see Stewart Die Casting Corp. v. N.L.R.B., (C.C.A. 7th, 1940)
114 F. (2d) 849; N.L.R.B. v. National Licorice Co., (C.C.A. 2d, 1939) 104 F. (2d)
655. It might be argued, however, that the employer still had the right to show that
the loss of a majority is due to factors other than the unfair labor practice.
9 N.L.R.B. v. Bradford Dyeing Assn., 310 U.S. 318, 60 S.Ct. 918 (1940);
International Assn. of Machinists v. N.L.R.B., 311 U.S. 72, 61 S.Ct. 83 (1940).
Se.e N.L.R.B. v. Falk Corp., 308 U.S. 453, 60 S.Ct. 307 (1940).
10 Principal case, 62 S.Ct. 397 at 397-398.
11 49 Stat. L. 449 (1935), 29 U.S.C. (1940), § 159 (a).
12 As a practical matter it might well be that due to the unfair labor practice the
petitioning union does not represent an uncoerced majority, for the refusal to bargain
collectively may have been the cause of the change. It would seem that then the board
would have the power to remedy this effect. See International Assn. of Machinists v.
N.L.R.B., 3II U.S. 72 at 82, 61 S.Ct. 83 (1940). However, the union previously
having a majority should not be immunized from changes in affiliation caused by other
factors. See Stewart Die Casting Corp. v. N.L.R.B., (C.C.A. 7th, 1940) u4 F. (2d)
849, where more than two years elapsed between the commission of the unfair labor
practice and the order of the court in the enforcement proceedings.
18 See generally Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co. v. N.L.R.B., (C.C.A. 8th, 1939)
104 F. (2d) 49; Oughton v. N.L.R.B., (C.C.A. 3d, 1941) u8 F. (2d) 486 (opinion
of the court on the first hearing), certiorari denied, (U.S. 1942) 62 S.Ct. 485.

